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Rarely claimed by linguists as labels for their own work, “structuralist” and “struc-
turalism” have been more often hurled at others as criticisms. Yet those doing the
hurlingwere themselves often pursuing a similarly formalist analysis, andwere not
averse to claiming their share of the academic capital that structuralism brought to
linguistics. Work by Émile Benveniste (1902–1976) and Aurélien Sauvageot (1897–
1988) shows different modes of a “resistant embrace” to structuralist formalism,
with their resistance centred on a perceived abandonment of attention to phono-
logical and philological detail; and to the role of speakers, a concern that culmi-
nates with Benveniste’s concept of enunciation. Their reactions are examined here
within the framework of two different ways in which structuralism was conceived,
one based on holism, the other on universalism.
1 Introduction
Quentin Skinner (1969) expressed concern about the growing use in the history
of ideas of the notion of paradigm, which had emerged in the history of art (Gom-
brich 1960) and of science (Kuhn 1962). Skinner argued that it fosters a mythol-
ogy that how people thought at any given period was more unified than has ever
historically been the case. Insofar as we buy into this “mythology of doctrines”,
Skinner writes, quoting Voltaire, “History then indeed becomes a pack of tricks
we play on the dead” (Skinner 1969: 7, 13–14).1
1The quote is from Voltaire’s letter to Pierre-Robert Le Cornier de Cideville, 9 Feb. 1757:
“l’histoire […] n’est, après tout, qu’un ramas de tracasseries qu’on fait aux morts”.
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We are ninety years on from the first uses of the term “structuralism” by lin-
guists,2 first to manifest, then to identify a paradigm, to which some subscribed
wholeheartedly, while others resisted no less strongly, and others still, a majority
perhaps, were ambivalent. This is not always easy to determine, making it all the
more tempting to use the mythology of doctrines to unify the middle decades of
the twentieth century into a structuralist period.
Not only do linguists no longer apply “structuralist” to our work, we even
struggle to remember what exactly it represented, and why it had the power it
did.3 Actually, “structuralist” and “structuralism” were more often hurled at oth-
ers as criticisms than claimed as methodological labels. Yet those doing the hurl-
ing were themselves often pursuing a recognizably structuralist form of analysis,
and were not averse to taking their share of the academic capital that structural-
ism brought to linguistics. This paper examines some of the modes of resistance
to the formalist commitments of structural linguistics in mid-twentieth-century
France — before the onset of a “post-structuralist” period — and explores what
drove it.
2Joseph (2001) gives details on these early uses, and later ones, as well as on the “structuralism”
proclaimed in psychology starting in 1907.
3Having detected recently that younger colleagues in my department were using the term “gen-
erative” in a way that struck me as different from my own use of it, I went around to some
of them and asked, “Are you a generativist?” This included phoneticians and phonologists as
well as people who work in pragmatics and syntax, none of them committed Chomskyans
like the people with whom I worked at the University of Maryland in the 1980s. Each of my
present colleagues whom I queried hesitated for a few seconds, then answered “yes”. I then
asked what “generativist” means to them. None of them mentioned innateness, or universal
grammar, or rules and representations, or principles and parameters, or infinite creativity or
any other of the ideas which I associate with generativism. Rather, all said that they are gener-
ativists because they believe in the existence of a language system which speakers know, and
which is the basis of language production and comprehension. This, to me, does not a gener-
ativist make. It is structuralism, part of the considerable structuralist heritage that continued
into generativism. But to make it the criterion for being a generativist is like being asked to
define Episcopalianism, and answering that it means believing in God. I have argued for a long
time now (since Joseph 1999, and most fully in Joseph 2002) that “American structuralism” ac-
tually begins not with Bloomfield and Sapir but with Chomsky, or else perhaps the day in 1942
when Jakobson landed in New York. Yet one now meets linguists who think that the idea of
a mental language system originated with Chomsky. When it comes to meaning in language,
my colleagues often prove to be pre-Saussurean, conceiving of a language as an encoding of a
pre-existing external reality — what Saussure rejected as “nomenclaturism”. They are divided
over whether the sound side is essentially mental or acoustic. In these respects they are not
yet structuralists, let alone generativists. But they value the label.
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2 Benveniste and structuralism
Émile Benveniste (1902–1976) was the most important French linguist of the
“structuralist period”. When asked about structuralism in interviews, he did not
keep his distance, but answered the question as though he embraced the term
and what it stood for (Benveniste 1974 [1968](a), Benveniste 1974 [1968](b)). His
linguistic work became progressively less structural in some senses of that term,
starting from when he resumed it after his Swiss exile during the war. Starting
in the 1950s and culminating in 1969, he introduced his concept of “enunciation”,
which is the direct opposite to the structuralist approach in key respects. As
discussed in section §6 below, his stated aim was not to replace structuralism,
but to supplement it — to provide a parallel mode of enquiry in which the fo-
cus is not on the structure of the langue, nor on parole, but on speakers; on the
“semantic” rather than the “semiotic”, in his terms, which seems to make him
pre-Saussurean, as does his placing of writing at the centre of language.
He continued to publish prolifically on ancient Indo-European languages, as
he had done since the 1920s, and also undertook fieldwork on American Indian
languages in Alaska and the Yukon, though he published little of this research.
He also produced a small but steady number of papers offering radical revisions
to key concepts of linguistic analysis such as person, deixis and performatives,
the sort of thing that his teacher Antoine Meillet (1866–1936) had often done. A
number of these papers were republished in 1966 in a volume entitled Problems in
General Linguistics, of which a second volume appeared in 1974.The 1966 volume
(henceforth referred to as plg 1, and the 1974 follow-up as plg 2) appeared just
at the time when “structuralism” as a generalized mode of enquiry was getting
established as dominant across the fields that comprise what in France are called
the “human sciences”, and indeed beyond.
The focus of Benveniste (1969) on words, rather than sounds and forms (al-
though they come into the picture in a secondary role), gives it a precarious place
within linguistics tout court, let alone structural linguistics, which treated words
as a pre-scientific concept, necessary to refer to when communicating with the
general public and specialists in other academic fields, but kept at bay in their
formal analyses. This despite two of the core figures of structural linguistics, Ro-
man Jakobson (1896–1982) and André Martinet (1908–1999), giving the titleWord
to the journal which they co-founded in New York in 1945. The 1969 book is
his attempt at the sort of structuralism that had spread beyond linguistics. He
read the work of his contemporaries such as Georges Dumézil (1898–1986) and
Georges Canguilhem (1904–1995) with admiration mixed with an awareness that
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the philological knowledge they brought to bear in their enquiries was shallow
in comparison with his own. Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009) could not see any-
where near so deeply into the cultures he studied as Benveniste could into the
remote Indo-European past.
Yet Benveniste, in spite of all his work aimed directly or indirectly at subvert-
ing structuralism, never rejected it. In contemplating why, I have been inclined to
attribute it to practical concerns: his awareness that structuralism, in promoting
linguistics to master science, had brought considerable advantages to the French
linguistics establishment and to him as its leader. That may sound like a cyni-
cal motive, except that Benveniste was not a Jakobson or a Martinet, men with
flamboyant personalities who strove to attract followers and worried about their
place in the academic pecking order. Benveniste’s place at the top was assured
institutionally, from Meillet’s death until his own forty years later, even during
the last seven years when he was paralysed by a stroke and could not speak or
write. The advantages which the wide attention to structuralism brought were
ones that he personally did not need, but they offered benefits to his students
and the other French linguists of whom he was the acknowledged leader.
There was still more to his ongoing semi-commitment to structuralism than
the pragmatic benefits for others. Even his late work contains signs that he was
drawn to what structuralism promised, in an almost religious way — like an ag-
nostic who never misses church, drawn to the vision and promise he aches to
believe in.4
It is striking how in a 1968 address (Benveniste 1974 [1970][b]: 95), and again
in a lecture the following January (Benveniste 2012: 79), Benveniste insists that
“the language contains the society”.5 Meillet (1905–1906) had been the first to
state in print, more than sixty years earlier, that “a language is a social fact”. But
Benveniste is asserting much more than that. To understand why, we can look
for example at the brief chapter headed thémis in his Vocabulaire des institutions
indo-européennes:
The general structure of society, defined in its broad divisions by a certain
number of concepts, rests on an assemblage of norms which add up to
4No links to traditional religious thinking are apparent in Benveniste’s work, but see Dosse (1997
[1991]: 245–247) on Christian interpretations of the semiology of Jacques Lacan (1901–1981), to
whom Benveniste was sufficiently close to have contributed an article to the first issue of his
journal La Psychanalyse (Benveniste 1966 [1956][b]), and on displaced Christianity in the work
of Louis Althusser (1918–1990), Lacan’s ally in the École Normale Supérieure (pp. 294–295).
5“[…] la langue contient la société.” He adds that “la langue inclut la société, mais elle n’est pas
incluse par elle” (the language includes the society, but is not included by it) (Benveniste 1974
[1970][b]: 96). Translations are mine unless otherwise indicated.
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“law”. All societies, even the most primitive […] are governed by principles
of law relating both to persons and to goods. The rules and these norms
are traceable in the vocabulary.
[…]We can in the first place posit for common Indo-European an extremely
important concept, that of “order”. It is represented by Vedic r̥ta, Iranian
arta (Armenian aša, by a special phonetic development). We have here one
of the cardinal notions of the legal world of the Indo-European to say noth-
ing of their religious and moral ideas: this is the concept of “Order” which
governs also the orderliness of the universe, the movement of the stars,
the regularity of the seasons and the years; and further the relations of
gods and men, and finally the relations of men to one another. Nothing
which concerns man or the world falls outside the realm of “Order”. It is
thus the foundation, both religious and moral, of every society. Without
this principle everything would revert to chaos. (Benveniste 2016 [1973]:
379–380)6
Benveniste is attuned to the differences among Indo-European societies.Words
that are not shared across the languages are interpreted as representing later his-
torical developments. Through close study of texts in which the words occur,
Benveniste works to establish their precise meanings, and in so doing to recon-
struct the societies themselves. In the case of words shared across all or the great
bulk of the family, he is reconstructing the earliest recoverable Indo-European
social stratum. The language contains the society.
His remarks about the nature of law are grounded in the findings of this lin-
guistic method, but also apply to the method itself, particularly to the guiding
principle of Benveniste’s training, which he embraces even as he resists it. Struc-
turalism is the search for the system that is “an assemblage of norms which add
6“La structure générale de la société, définie dans ses grandes divisions par un certain nombre
de concepts, repose sur un ensemble de normes qui constituent un droit. Toutes les sociétés,
mêmes les plus primitives, […] sont régies par des principes de droit quant aux personnes et aux
biens. Ces règles et ces normes se marquent dans le vocabulaire. […] On peut poser, dès l’état
indo-européen, un concept extrêmement important : celui de l’‘ordre’. Il est représenté par le
védique r̥ta, iranien arta (avestique aša, par une évolution phonétique particulière). C’est là une
des notions cardinales de l’univers juridique et aussi religieux et moral des Indo-Européens :
c’est l’‘Ordre’ qui règle aussi bien l’ordonnance de l’univers, le mouvement des astres, la péri-
odicité des saisons et des années que les rapports des hommes et des dieux, enfin des hommes
entre eux. Rien de ce qui touche à l’homme, au monde, n’échappe à l’empire de l’‘Ordre’. C’est
donc le fondement tant religieux que moral de toute société; sans ce principe, tout retournerait
au chaos” (Benveniste 1969: vol. 2, 99–100).
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up to ‘law’ ”. No wonder its draw was so strong: it “is the concept of ‘Order’
which governs also the orderliness of the universe, the movement of the stars,
[…] the relations of men to one another”. It is as true of structure in language as
of order in law and society that “Without this principle everything would revert
to chaos”.
Who knows whether Benveniste saw, let alone intended, the reflexivity of his
comments? But a few paragraphs on, after going through various Indo-Iranian,
Greek and Latin reflexes of this root ar–, including Latin ars “art” and ritus “rite”,
Latin artus “joint” and Greek árthon “joint, limb”, he remarks: “Everywhere the
same notion is still perceptible: order, arrangement, the close mutual adaptation
of the parts of a whole to one another […]” (Benveniste 1969: 101).7 If you seek a
definition of the structuralist view of the language system, look no further.8
So why did Benveniste not seek unambivalently to be the Galileo of language,
reducing the vast chaos of diversity to Order? The clue is in the word ‘reducing’.
Reduction is the genius of structuralism. Its ancient and deep-seated appeal in
our languages and cultures is evident in Benveniste’s analysis of thémis. The one
small minority to which it might not appeal are those who actually love the
vast diversity of languages, who enjoy nothing more than reading ancient texts
in barely-known languages and working through their minute details. In other
words, linguists, particularly the sort who entered the field in the nineteenth
and the first two-thirds of the twentieth centuries, and who still exist, in reduced
numbers.
I am suggesting that the founding tension in structuralism was that it was
driven by a reductionist search for order, carried out by people who varied con-
siderably in how fast and how far they thought such reduction could legitimately
be taken. Indeed, some of them believed that legitimate knowledge required an
7“Partout, la même notion est encore sensible : l’ordonnance, l’ordre, l’adaptation étroite entre
les parties d’un tout […]”. ar– is also the root of French ordre and English order.
8The desire to find order in language, with the promise it held out of keeping everything from
reverting to chaos, was by no means exclusive to linguists. It was extremely widespread, lying
behind movements for language standardization, and for what linguists disparage as prescrip-
tivism. In my view, the descriptivist-prescriptivist dichotomy is ultimately rhetorical, a veneer
which masks a shared desire for order — law and order, given how fond linguists have always
been of discovering laws comparable to those by which the movement of the stars is explained.
One might expect linguists to regard prescriptivism as a phenomenon of language understand-
ing and use, as worthy of study and analysis as their supposedly prescription-free data, but
such an outlook is rare. We claim the unique right to define what order is and how it is to be
sought, and see it as our duty to stamp out other conceptions of order in language, exposing
their ignorance and error and treating them as an even greater threat to order because they
decline to acknowledge our unique authority.
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accumulation of ever greater data and detail, in direct contrast to the genius of
structuralism, and they would form the hard resistance. But my interest here is
in the soft resistance of those who embraced the programme even while holding
it at bay. Who smoked, but didn’t inhale.
3 The issue of discontinuity
I shall start from the end of the structuralist period, and the critique of struc-
turalist linguistics mounted from the 1970s onward by Henri Meschonnic (1932–
2000), who belonged to the generation of Benveniste’s students.9 This is well
into the period which, outside France, was being labelled as “post-structuralist”,
characterized by resistance to key aspects of structuralist work being mounted
by academics from fields other than linguistics. Such was the din from without
that Meschonnic’s resistance from within did not have the full impact one might
have expected. Like the integrationist critique of linguistics mounted by RoyHar-
ris (1931–2015) at Oxford, it produced a clique of devoted followers, along with
rejection and enmity from the linguistics mainstream — which however had by
now cut itself off from any commitments to a structuralism henceforth associ-
ated with the past. This masked its enduring heritage, and made it inevitable
that by the late 2010s linguists would no longer distinguish structuralism from
generativism.
For Meschonnic, the tragedy of structuralism lay in what he called its “tri-
umphalism of scientizing the discontinuous” (triomphalisme d’un scientisme du
discontinu) (Meschonnic 2009: 20). It is true that, if you ask a linguist what lin-
guistics is, the answer you are likely to get is, first, something about the scientific
study of language, and then a litany of the sub-specializations, phonology, syn-
tax, semantics, historical linguistics, sociolinguistics etc. and what they are con-
cerned with.10 The existence of those sub-fields, with their division of the labour
of analysing sound, order, meaning and the rest each allotted to specialists, is
taken to signify the field’s progress to a mature state. Specialists tend to avoid
treading on each other’s turf; yet no one would deny that the ultimate goal is an
understanding of language as a whole. The institutionalizing of discontinuity is
seen as a means to that end, yet, as Meschonnic shows, it has tended to become
an end in itself.
9His magnum opus, Meschonnic (1982), sits within a massive output that branches across the
disciplinary boundaries which he rejected.
10For an example, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7HOsQDD1Res.
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Taking inspiration from Benveniste’s (1974 [1970](a)) conception of utterance,
the perspective which starts from the speaker or writer rather than from the
linguistic system, Meschonnic devoted his mature career to exposing the struc-
turalist fetishization of the discontinuous and shifting the focus to the continu
(“continuous”) in language. It is not always clear who did and did not count as
a structuralist for him, though Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) definitely did
not. In fact, when Meschonnic reads out his charge sheet against structuralism,
each of the nine crimes is described in its opposition to Saussure. Here are the
first three:
1. when Saussure says “system”, a dynamic notion, structuralism says “struc-
ture”, a formal and ahistorical notion;
2. when Saussure proposes that with language all we have are points of view
— a crucial notion: representations — structuralism with the sign presents
itself as describing the nature of language;
3. and Saussure constructs the notion of point of view according to an en-
tirely deductive (rational-logical) internal systematicity, but structuralism
created descriptive (empirical) sciences of language […].
(Meschonnic 2009: 20)11
Again, he is right about the discontinuous — though it is complicated. Starting
in the 1920s, those who got called structuralists, or more rarely, called themselves
that, were torn between two urges. One was to reject the methods of an earlier
generation who wanted to decompose phenomena into elements. That can be
construed as a desire for continuousness. The other was to seek out what con-
nects phenomena to each other, and doing that demanded the decomposition
into discontinuous elements that their first urge was to reject.
Early structuralists invoked Gestalt psychology as continuous with what they
were trying to achieve. By 1945, the first volume of Word contains two articles
laying out visions of structuralism that superficially overlap, but in fact embody
these complexly opposed urges. For the older writer, Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945),
11“1. quand Saussure dit système, notion dynamique, le structuralisme dit structure, notion
formelle et ahistorique ; 2. quand Saussure pose que sur le langage on n’a que des points de
vue, notion capitale : des représentations, le structuralisme avec le signe se présente comme
décrivant la nature du langage ; 3. et Saussure construit la notion de point de vue selon une
systématicité interne toute déductive, mais le structuralisme a fait des sciences du langage de-
scriptives […]”. Saussure’s theory of language was famously laid out in the posthumous Cours
de linguistique générale (Saussure 1922 [1916]).
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systems such as language need to be approached holistically. Language for Cas-
sirer (1945: 110) is organic, “in the sense that it does not consist of detached, iso-
lated, segregated facts. It forms a coherent whole in which all parts are interde-
pendent upon each other”.
The younger Lévi-Strauss seems at first to be singing from the same hymn
sheet when he rejects the analysis of kinship by W. H. R. Rivers (1864–1922)
on the grounds that it is concerned merely with an atomistic charting of the de-
tails of relationships in some particular society: “Each terminological detail, each
special marriage rule, is attached to a different custom, like a consequence or a
vestige: we descend into an orgy of discontinuity” (Lévi-Strauss 1945: 37).12
But a careful reading shows Lévi-Strauss singing in a different key from Cas-
sirer. His concern is not with organicity, but with the failure to take a univer-
salist point of view, one that looks past superficial differences to find how kin-
ship systems are fundamentally the same from culture to culture. They must be
so, Lévi-Strauss assumes, because the human relationships they encode are the
same. Taking maternal uncles as an example, he writes:
We see that the avunculate, to be understood, must be treated as a rela-
tionship interior to a system, and that it is the system itself which must be
considered in its totality, in order to perceive its structure. (Lévi-Strauss
1945: 47)13
If this sounds like Cassirer’s holism, the resemblance is deceptive because of
what Lévi-Strauss understands by “system”. It is not like Saussure’s language
system, which is specific to each particular language. Lévi-Strauss is not talking
about the Yoruba kinship system, as distinct from the Inuit one. He means the
human kinship system, regarded as a product of evolutionary forces.
There is a double continuity-discontinuity tension at work in this defining
structuralist moment: on the one hand, holism versus atomism, Cassirer’s ten-
sion; on the other hand, the universal versus the language-culture-particular,
Lévi-Strauss’s tension.Meschonnic’s discontentwith the discontinuous falls with-
in the first type. When he takes up arms against the structuralist dissociation of
language from the body, he cites language-culture-particular examples (notably
12“Chaque détail de terminologie, chaque règle spéciale du mariage, est rattachée à une coutume
différente, comme une conséquence ou comme un vestige : on tombe dans une débauche de
discontinuité.”
13“Nous voyons donc que l’avunculat, pour être compris, doit être traité comme une relation
intérieure à un système, et que c’est le système lui-même qui doit être considéré dans son
ensemble, pour en apercevoir la structure.”
149
John E. Joseph
from the Hebrew of the Old Testament, but also from modern languages) as evi-
dence for a universal language-body continuity. Any language-culture-particular
versus universal tension is left aside, or at least pushed into the background.14
Lévi-Strauss sees the development of phonology, as opposed to the merely
physical, empirical study of phonetics, as “playing for the social sciences the
same renewing role as nuclear physics, for example, has played for the exact
sciences” (Lévi-Strauss 1945: 35).15 He locates the renewal in four fundamental
points of method identified in 1933 by Nicolai S. Trubetzkoy (1890–1938):
[F]irst, phonology passes from the study of conscious linguistic phenomena
to the study of their unconscious linguistic infrastructure; it refuses to treat
terms as independent entities, instead taking as the basis of its analysis
the relations between terms; it introduces the notion of system […]; and
finally it aims at discovering general laws either by induction or by logical
deduction, […] which gives them an absolute character. (Lévi-Strauss 1945:
35)16
The second and third points, concerning relations and system, are ones Cas-
sirer would have endorsed. But the unconscious is not a concept Cassirer deals
with. Although he recognises that consciousness “grows” in the child, the dyad
suggested by Lévi-Strauss would have been too simplistic for his liking.
When Cassirer talks about atomism and holism, it is on the level of a particu-
lar system. Lévi-Strauss talks about atomism and totality of the general system,
for example the avunculate, considered universally. The two approaches are not
always at cross purposes, only sometimes, but enough to generate an enduring
tension within structuralism. A defining moment came in 1955, when the suc-
cès fou of Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes Tropiques defined structuralism for the public at
large and for the next generation of scholars. Cassirer’s worries about internal
discontinuity were shunted aside, not to vanish but to fester.
For Meschonnic and his contemporaries who took up academic posts with the
expansion of the Parisian university system after May 1968, structuralism stood
14The tensions we repress can come back to haunt us, and this, I argue in Joseph (2018b), is
potentially the case with Meschonnic’s approach to the Hebrew-language body.
15“[…] vis-à-vis des sciences sociales, le même rôle rénovateur que la physique nucléaire, par
exemple, a joué pour l’ensemble des sciences exactes.”
16“[E]n premier lieu, la phonologie passe de l’étude des phénomènes linguistiques conscients à
celle de leur infrastructure inconsciente ; elle refuse de traiter les termes comme des entités
indépendantes, prenant au contraire comme base de son analyse les relations entres les termes
; elle introduit la notion de système […] ; enfin elle vise à la découverte de lois générales soit
trouvées par induction, soit déduites logiquement, […] ce qui leur donne un caractère absolu.”
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for discontinuity. In linguistics, that meant treating phonology, prosody, mor-
phology, syntax, semantics, semiology and so on as separate levels of language
and distinct areas of specialization; and divorcing linguistics from poetics or ap-
plied areas such as translation, and ultimately even semiology, though linguistics
continued to focus on the sign and combinations of signs as the essence of lan-
guage.This never sat well withMeschonnic, but since hewas teaching linguistics,
he could only go so far in opposing it in these early years of his career, though
later he would attack it relentlessly.
The greatest damage wrought by this discontinuity, as Meschonnic saw it, was
that it resulted in the unifying core of language — rhythm — being relegated to a
minor corner, when it should be at the very centre of an investigative enterprise
where everything connects to everything else. Meschonnic’s rejection of struc-
turalist linguistics can be read as an assertion that structuralism itself was not
structuralist enough.
4 Benveniste’s early work: in what sense is it
structuralist?
Can Benveniste’s earlier work really be called structuralist? It is, after all, di-
achronic rather than synchronic in orientation, where structuralism is usually
characterized as having replaced diachronic with synchronic enquiry. But that
characterization is flawed — it is based on a misunderstanding of “diachronic” as
a synonym of “historical”, when Saussure’s intention in calling for a diachronic
linguistics was for it to replace the historical tracing of sound and forms through
time with, instead, the comparison of états de langue at different points in time,
each analysed synchronically. Saussure’s 1879 Mémoire on the primitive vowel
system of the Indo-European languages is really a synchronic study, a reconstruc-
tion of the system at some indeterminate point in the past. Benveniste’s doctoral
thesis and first published book (1935) follows the model of Saussure’sMémoire to
the extent possible, given that it is a morphological rather than a phonological
system that he is reconstructing.
The first three-quarters of Benveniste’s book consists of focussed surveys of
forms and alternations that appear to have been written as separate studies. Not
until Chapter 9 does Benveniste explain how they fit together.
All the lines of facts we have traced have led us progressively and by ul-
timately converging paths to recognize in neuters and adjectives a coher-
ent structure and rule-governed alternations. In turn, these nominal forms
151
John E. Joseph
posited in their most ancient state reveal principles which, once defined,
confronted and grouped, constitute a theory of the Indo-European root.
(Benveniste 1935: 147)17
Before explaining what that theory is, however, Benveniste sets out his struc-
turalist stall, with a sweeping attack on everything written on the subject hereto-
fore:
What has been taught up to now about the nature and modalities of the
root is, in truth, a heteroclite assemblage of empirical notions, provisional
recipes, archaic and recent forms, all with an irregularity and complexity
which defy ordering. (Benveniste 1935: 147)18
He illustrates this with a catalogue of reconstructed roots varying from one
to five phonemes in length, monosyllabic or disyllabic, with either a vowel or a
diphthong as their nucleus,
with an initial vowel (*ar–) or a final vowel (*po–); in long degree (*sēd–) or
zero degree (*dhək–); with a long diphthong (*srēig–) or a short diphthong
(*bheudh–), with a suffix or a lengthening, etc. It would be difficult to justify
or even to enumerate completely all the types of roots that are attributed
to Indo-European. (Benveniste 1935: 147)19
This is akin to what Lévi-Strauss a decade later will disparage as “an orgy of
discontinuity” in Rivers’ ethnography, which he wants to replace with a struc-
tural analysis (see section §3). One might expect Benveniste to argue that no
language could be this complicated, but he does not. His critique extends only to
the analysis:
17“Toutes les lignes de faits que nous avons suivies nous ont acheminé [sic] progressivement et
par des voies finalement convergentes à reconnaître aux neutres et aux adjectifs une structure
cohérente et des alternances réglées. A leur tour, ces formes nominales posées en leur état le
plus ancien révèlent des principes qui, une fois définis, confrontés et groupés, constituent une
théorie de la racine indo-européenne.”
18“Ce qu’on a enseigné jusqu’ici de la nature et des modalités de la racine est, au vrai, un as-
semblage hétéroclite de notions empiriques, de recettes provisoires, de formes archaïques et
récentes, le tout d’une irrégularité et d’une complication qui défient l’ordonnance.”
19“[…] à voyelle initiale (*ar–) ou à voyelle finale (*po–) ; à degré long (*sēd–) ou à degré zéro
(*dhək–) ; à diphthongue longue (*srēig–) ou brève (*bheudh–), à suffixe ou à élargissement, etc.
On serait en peine de justifier et même d’énumerer complètement tous les types de racines qui
sont attribués à l’indo-européen.” It is interesting that *ar–, the root of order and its congeners
in other Indo-European languages as discussed in section §2 above, should figure among the
examples here.
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There is here an abuse of words that betrays an indecisive doctrine. The
way to arrive at Indo-European is not by piling up the various Indo-Eu-
ropean forms with a verbal theme, nor by projecting into prehistory the
particularities of an attested language state. It is necessary to try, through
broad comparisons, to find the initial system in its simplest form, then to
see what principles modify its economy. It is this mechanism that we are
attempting to define here. (Benveniste 1935: 147–148)20
Anumber ofwords are striking: Saussure’s système, and alsomécanisme, which
occurs repeatedly in the Cours; but also économie, in a sense more reminiscent of
Martinet, Benveniste’s younger contemporary and, in Martinet’s mind at least,
his rival. As Benveniste pursues this theme, the word structure, absent from the
Cours, comes to dominate:
The essential thing being the problem of structure, we shall neglect on
principle questions of “value”, “aspect” etc. If the definition of the root we
arrive at is judged to be valid, these notions of value and aspect will have
the morphological basis which they now lack. It will then be the right time
to re-examine them. (Benveniste 1935: 147–148)21
“Value” does not refer here to Saussurean valeur, but to amore particular use of
the term byMeillet whenwriting in his proto-sociolinguistic vein, where he talks
about the “abstract” and “concrete” value of words, linking the abstract to the
aristocratic, and to the oldest, most enduring strain of the Indo-European lexicon,
whereas the concrete belongs to the peasantry, is imbued with “affective” value
and is historically unstable. As for “aspect”, it figures in Meillet’s work mainly
in its familiar form, referring for instance to perfective versus imperfective in
verbs, but more extensively. For example, “verbs bearing preverbs offer a nuance
of ‘aspect’ different from that of the simple verb: they indicate a process, the
20“Il y a ici un abus de mots qui trahit une doctrine indécise. On n’obtient pas de l’indo-européen
en additionnant les diverses formes indo-européennes d’un thème verbal ni en projetant dans
la préhistoire les particularités d’un état de langue historique. Il faut essayer, par de larges
comparaisons, de retrouver le système initial sous sa forme la plus simple, puis de voir quels
principes en modifient l’économie. C’est ce mécanisme que nous cherchons à définir ici.”
21“L’essentiel étant le problème de la structure, nous négligerons en principe les questions de
‘valeur’, d’‘aspect’, etc. Si la définition de la racine à laquelle nous aboutirons est jugée valable,
ces notions de valeur et d’aspect auront le fondementmorphologique qui leur fait encore défaut.
Il sera temps alors d’en reprendre l’étude.”
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end of which is envisaged” (Meillet 1931: 263–264).22 Although Benveniste has
dismissed, or rather postponed, investigation of aspect in the same breath with
that of value, aspect in the more usual, limited sense is actually central to his
theory of the Indo-European root. What he is doing here is distancing himself
from Meillet’s extension of the concept, where Meillet tends to link it with the
“mentality” of speakers — this despite the fact that Meillet repeatedly places his
analyses in opposition to that of “Mr Vossler and his school” on the grounds that
they have recourse to mentality. Meillet’s accounts are not as different from Karl
Vossler’s (1872–1949) as his rhetoric would make it appear. Regarding tense and
aspect in the development from early Latin to Classical Latin, Meillet writes of
how
with the development of a civilization of intellectual character, in which
the thinking of the upper echelon takes an exact philosophical turn, and in
which children and youths are educated in schools, the notion of “tense”
takes precedence over the notion of “aspect”. (Meillet 1931: 270–271)23
Again, a matter of sociolinguistics: the thinking of the upper echelon, edu-
cation in schools being invoked to explain the rise of rational, which is to say
abstract, tense – not entirely replacing concrete aspect, but taking precedence
over it, quite as the upper echelon, the aristocracy, take precedence over the
peasantry.
The development of structural linguistics is then a story of difference, of dif-
ferentiating oneself from someone else who is perceived as too psychological,
insufficiently concerned with establishing the facts of language structure before
offering explanations of them, rendering dubious the sustainability of those ex-
planations. Meillet sees Vossler’s “idealism” as too, well, idealist, whereas his
own approach is better grounded in “concrete” facts. In historical terms Meil-
let believes that the move from the concrete to the abstract represents progress;
and so too in methodological terms, in that his own method proceeds in this
22“[…] les verbes munis de préverbes offrent une nuance d’‘aspect’ différente de celle du verbe
simple : ils indiquent un procès dont le terme est envisagé.” He gives the contrasting examples
of Nec tacui demens “I was mad enough not to keep silent” (Aeneid II, 94) and Conticuere
omnes “All fell silent” (Aeneid II, 1), where, since the highlighted verbs have the same root and
are both in the perfect tense, the preverb con– is analysed as conveying the perfective aspect.
23“[…] avec le développement d’une civilisation de caractère intellectuel, où la pensée des
hommes dirigeants prend un tour philosophique exact, où les enfants et les jeunes gens se
forment dans les écoles, la notion de ‘temps’ prenne le pas sur la notion d’‘aspect’ ”. In his
review of Vossler (1932), Firth (1933: 234) contrasts Vossler’s conception of “inner language
form” with Saussure’s “‘bloodless system of signs’ (langue)”.
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way, deducing higher-level explanations from detailed examination of phenom-
ena. Whereas abstraction that is not so deduced, but simply asserted, risks being
fantasy, and so is not progress at all; not a nobility destined to rule over the
concrete-minded, but a tyranny that the true nobles must resist.
Meillet is polite when rejecting Vossler, keeping his remarks to a minimum.
When it comes Benveniste’s turn to make a similar move vis-à-vis Meillet, he is
more than polite towards his cher maître, not even naming him, just two features
of his analysis of Latin, value and aspect in its extended sense, which he says he
wants not to eliminate, but to postpone, until the structure of Indo-European
is better established. This is not even a criticism of Meillet’s analysis of Latin,
a language the structure of which is well established — at least, not an overt
criticism. But perhaps he is undertaking some distancing fromwhat is said in the
Preface to Meillet (1931), which, after underscoring the role of value and aspect
as key features of the analysis, ends with a paragraph thanking Benveniste for
helping to revise the text and compiling its index.
One of the curious aspects of Benveniste (1935) is the sizeable gap between
the title, “origins of the formation of nouns”, and the contents, which are not
restricted to nouns, but culminate in a “unitary and constant definition of the
Indo-European root and its aspects” (une définition unitaire et constante de la
racine indo-européenne et de ses aspects) (Benveniste 1935: 170). This definition
says that the “Indo-European root is monosyllabic, triliterate, composed of the
fundamental vowel ĕ between two different consonants”, then gives four further
specifications about how it may be constituted (Benveniste 1935: 170–171).24 Ben-
veniste’s theory of the Indo-European root was received by Indo-Europeanists
somewhat as Saussure’s Mémoire had been received: with astonishment at its
daring brilliance and respect for its command of linguistic data, mixed with a
wait-and-see dubiety that is appropriate with any stunningly simple model, to
which scholars are bound to respond with examples that do not appear to fit it.
In the longer term, Benveniste’s approach to Indo-European reconstruction
has not held up,25 and has even been rejected as “brutally reductionist” (Dunkel
1981: 560).That does at least furnish himwith strong credentials as a structuralist
— but one determined to supplement the formalist approach with serious consid-
eration of what speakers do with language, redeeming his 1935 promissory note
to re-examine notions of value and aspect if his morphological analysis proves
valid. This is what he began to do after the war.
24“La racine indo-européenne est monosyllabique, trilitère, composée de la voyelle fondamentale
ĕ entre deux consonnes différentes.”
25I am grateful to the eminent Indo-Europeanist and Benveniste scholar Georges-Jean Pinault
for confirming to me that this is the case.
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5 The spirit of philology in Sauvageot
Another French linguist of the “structuralist period”, Aurélien Sauvageot (1897–
1988) was born in Constantinople, to a Belgian mother and a French father work-
ing as an architect for the Sultan. As a student at the British School of Pera the
boy, a natural polyglot, learned English and German, and also picked up Greek
and Turkish (see Jean-Robert Armogathe’s Preface to Sauvageot 2013: 9). In 1911
his family returned to Paris, where, preparing for the competitive examination
for entry into the École Normale Supérieure, he came toMeillet’s attention.Many
years later Sauvageot would recall his first summons to a private meeting at Meil-
let’s home, in September 1914. The seventeen-year-old made a confession:
“Look, Professor, I should tell you straightaway that I have no visual mem-
ory”.
“What?”
“No, with me everything happens only with phonic memory, or acoustic if
you prefer. I have only auditory images. So I’m really bad at linking what
I hear with what’s written, and I can only work on a language insofar as I
know how it’s pronounced”.
“Oh, how extraordinary,” he said to me, “because I, you see, never hear any
auditory image”.
And I said to him: “But, then, how do you think?”.
And he said to me: “Well, by sequences of written signs”.
With that a lot of things made sense to me. It was one of the first discoveries
I made about Meillet. (Sauvageot 1992: 193)26
Both are rather extreme cases. Sauvageot’s mind worked as one might expect
a blind lad’s to, Meillet’s a deaf man’s. There are deep differences in how people
think, differences we tend to erase, or sort into normal and pathological cases. I
shall come back round to Sauvageot’s acute acoustic sensitivity and memory.
26“Je lui dis : ‘Ecoutez, Monsieur le Professeur, je vous dis tout de suite que je n’ai pas de mémoire
visuelle.’ ‘Comment?’ ‘Non, chez moi tout se passe uniquement avec la mémoire phonique ou
si vous voulez acoustique. Je n’ai que des images auditives. Alors, je suis très malheureux pour
lier ce que j’entends à ce qui s’écrit et que je ne peux travailler sur une langue que dans la
mesure où je sais comment elle se prononce.’ ‘Oh, c’est extraordinaire, me dit-il, parce que moi,
alors, voyez-vous, je n’entends jamais une image auditive.’ Et je lui dis : ‘Mais, alors, comment
pensez-vous?’ Et il me dit : ‘Eh bien, par séquences de signes écrits.’ Alors là, j’ai compris bien
des choses. Cela a été une des premières découvertes que j’ai faites de Meillet.”
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In April 1917 Sauvageot received another summons, this time toMeillet’s office.
The only French linguist covering Finno-Ugric, Robert Gauthiot (1876–1916), had
been killed in the war, and it was decided that Sauvageot would have to replace
him, even though he knew no Finno-Ugric language at the time. He askedwhy he
had been chosen, andMeillet replied, “Why, that’s simple, because youwere born
in Constantinople, you spoke Turkish and you still know a fair bit of Turkish,
that’s why, and because Turkish is a language whose mechanism is very similar
to that of the Finno-Ugric languages” (Sauvageot 1992: 194).27
Meillet sensed the young Sauvageot’s lack of enthusiasm at the prospect, but
assured him that it would come. And come it did, verymuch so, fromhis arrival in
Finland in the summer of 1919 (the date is from Perrot 2007: 296), where he began
studying FinnishwithMeillet’s friend Emil Nestor Setälä (1864–1935). For the rest
of Sauvageot’s long life, Setälä would remain one of his principal touchstones
not just for Finnish but for the understanding of language generally, rivalled
only by Setälä’s Hungarian friend Zoltán Gombocz (1877–1935), along with, of
course, Meillet, and the linguist Meillet revered above all others, his own teacher
Saussure.These four were not a foursome, but a pair of twosomes; and we can see
throughout Sauvageot’s career a tension between what “structural” linguistics
came to represent, versus the sometimes diametrically opposed concerns of the
Finnish and Hungarian philologists.
Jump ahead now thirty years. Meillet had died in 1936. Benveniste, who suc-
ceeded him in his chair in the Collège de France, that last surviving royal in-
stitution, was king of the nation’s linguists. The dauphin, Martinet, had exiled
himself to New York after being hounded from the Sorbonne under suspicion
of having been a collaborator (see Joseph 2016). Beneath Benveniste were the
barons, including Sauvageot. He had occupied the first chair of Finno-Ugric lan-
guages in France, in the École Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes, Paris,
since it was established in 1931, with an interruption from 1941–43 at the insis-
tence of the Vichy government (Perrot 2007: 296), probably because for years
he had been a prominent and outspoken member of the Communist Party (see
Chevalier 2006: 158).
Sauvageot was also active in the Institut de Linguistique, which held monthly
lectures by the linguistic aristocracy, many of them aimed at surveying the struc-
tures of non-Indo-European languages. In 1946 Sauvageot published his Esquisse
de la langue finnoise (Sketch of the Finnish language) in a series called “L’Homme
27“‘Mais c’est simple, parce que vous êtes né à Constantinople, que vous avez parlé le turc et que
vous savez encore pas mal de turc, voilà, et que le turc est une langue dont le mécanisme est
très semblable à celui des langues finno-ougriennes’.”
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et Son Langage” (Man and his language) put out by La Nouvelle Édition in Paris.
Three years later, the same book was published by Klincksieck, as the first vol-
ume in a new series that Sauvageot started called “Les langues et leurs structures”
(Languages and their structures).28 The 1949 Avertissement (Preface) announces
three other volumes as forthcoming in the series, on Modern Greek, Tamil and
Berber, and explains that the aim is to create “a series of descriptive studies bear-
ing on idioms as diverse as possible, each envisaged in isolation, taken in itself”
(Sauvageot 1946: 7).29 Each book will “extricate through an appropriate analysis
the characteristics inherent to a given language, grasped at a given moment of
its evolution, and reveal the mechanism of the system of functions of which it is
constituted” (Sauvageot 1946: 7).30
That sounds quite structural — but “mechanism” is a loose concept. Used as
a metaphor in linguistic work since the nineteenth century (see Joseph 2018a),
it seems to have meant something rather specific to Sauvageot, and perhaps id-
iosyncratic to him. Sauvageot’s life’s work had been determined because, as Meil-
let said, “Turkish is a language whose mechanism is very similar to that of the
Finno-Ugric languages”. The Preface continues:
Up to now it has often been affirmed that a language is an ensemble in
which all the parts fit together and the categories that supposedly form
the foundation of the structure of a language have beenmuch evoked. Only
there has been a negligence in adding to the debate the concrete testimony
that must be brought in by the descriptive study of a given state of lan-
guage. (Sauvageot 1946: 7)31
What has been affirmed “up to now” is the Saussurean conception of the lan-
guage system.The toutes les parties se tiennent is a slight rewording of the famous
28Not only were the title and text unchanged, but they bear the copyright and printing date
1946, so apparently the unsold copies were simply given a new cover with the fresher date
of 1949. Curiously, the cover and copyright page both give the year 1949, and yet the legally
required final page gives the date of printing 24 August 1946, and the legal deposition as the
third trimester of 1946 (“Achevé d’imprimer […] le 24 août 1946. Dépôt légal: 3e trimestre 1946”).
The book must therefore have been completed by mid-1946.
29“[…] une série d’études descriptives portant sur des idiomes aussi divers que possible, envisagés
chacun isolément, pris en soi.”
30“Il s’agit de dégager par une analyse appropriée les caractères inhérents à une langue donnée,
saisie à un moment donné de son évolution et d’exposer le mécanisme du système de fonctions
dont elle est constitutée.”
31“Jusqu’à présent il a été souvent affirmé qu’une langue est un ensemble où toutes les parties
se tiennent et l’on a beaucoup évoqué les catégories qui formeraient le fondement de la struc-
ture d’une langue. Seulement on a négligé de verser au débat le témoignage concret que doit
apporter l’étude descriptive d’un état de langue donné.”
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motto tout se tient (everything supports everything else), attributed to Saussure
though first used in print by Meillet (1903: 407). It is probably fair to say that
structural linguistics does indeed make “categories” the foundation of the struc-
ture of a language, if categories are put into a binary contrast with “concrete tes-
timony”, and if that testimony means actual sounds and utterances: phonetics as
opposed to phonology, and parole as opposed to langue. By taking up Saussure’s
état de langue, state of language, as the place where this concrete testimony is
to be found, Sauvageot hints that it is not against Saussure that he is position-
ing himself, but against later structuralists who claim to be following Saussure’s
programme but are perhaps instead betraying it.
Sauvageot specifies that by “descriptive study” he does not mean simply enu-
merating grammatical processes or inventorying the most used paradigms, but
rather “a prospecting effort to penetrate beyond simple grammatical analysis into
the domain of expression of which grammar is so to speak only the more or less
schematic skeleton” (Sauvageot 1946: 7).32 This domain of expression includes
“syntax, semantics and vocabulary”, all of which are, he rightly notes, neglected
in structural grammars. He wants to get to them through “sufficiently detailed
analytic descriptions of concrete examples of the behaviour of a certain number
of linguistic structures” (Sauvageot 1946: 7).33 Here nearly every word is charged
with potentially polemical meaning: Sauvageot is implicitly accusing structural
linguistics of being insufficiently detailed in its analysis of individual linguistic
structures, of failing to use concrete examples, of taking a broad-brush approach
rather than focussing on “a certain number” of structures in depth, and of ne-
glecting the “behaviour” of the structures, in favour of simple inventories. What
he means by behaviour is expanded upon at the start of the book proper:
What makes the originality of an idiom is not the presence of this or that
particular structural feature but how the structure as a whole is arranged,
the use that is made of it and the performance that is obtained from it for
the needs of the expression of thought. (Sauvageot 1946: 13)34
The concern with “arrangement” is an embrace of the core principle of Saus-
surean linguistics, which Sauvageot thought however had not been adequately
32“[…] un effort de prospection pour pénétrer par delà la simple analyse grammaticale dans le
domaine de l’expression dont la grammaire n’est pour ainsi dire que le squelette plus ou moins
schématique.”
33“[…] des descriptions analytiques suffisamment poussées, des exemples concrets du comporte-
ment d’un certain nombre de structures linguistiques.”
34“Ce qui fait l’originalité d’un idiome, ce n’est pas la présence de tel ou tel trait particulier de
structure mais la façon dont l’ensemble de cette structure est agencée, l’usage qui en est fait et
le rendement qui en est obtenu pour les besoins de l’expression de la pensée.”
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buttressed with attention to particular features. The concern with “performance”
may again be his embrace of Saussure’s all-but-forgotten call for a linguistics
of parole. The concern with expression of thought reveals a tension within Sau-
vageot himself, in that he will often insist that language must be understood
as a tool of communication, the traditional alternative to representation or self-
expression as the primal and formative purpose of language.
The strongest evidence that Sauvageot is taking a polemical stance comes
when he claims to be “observation” personified: “In doing this, we have not the
least intention of diffusing the theories of a school. We are focussed above all on
describing the facts as they present themselves to observation, by disregarding
any preconceptions” (Sauvageot 1946: 7–8).35 But the language he has used up to
this point already belongs to a school, that of structural linguistics, and its un-
derlying theory is not immediately dissociable from that language, even when he
is positioning himself against aspects of that theory. That positioning is itself a
theory, and since this Preface is for a whole series of books by different authors,
it looks as though Sauvageot is trying to form a school and to diffuse its theories.
How his treatment of Finnish is distinct from a structural one can be seen from
the opening sentence.
To the ear, Finnish seems “loud”, a bit hoarse and abrupt, the whole spouted
rapidly in a rhythm with rather close beats, modulated according to a mu-
sical phrasing with rather sharp but descending notes that appear to follow
an almost unvarying curve. Finnish discourse knows only a few melodic
deviations between the peaks and troughs of modulation. The monotonous
repetition of these modulations makes one think right away that the lan-
guage modulates not in order to express, but only to mark out the elements
of the flow.
The vowels “mark”; they burst joyfully on speakers’ lips, whereas the con-
sonants are muffled sometimes to the point of being whispered. (Sauvageot
1946: 15)36
35“Ce faisant, nous n’avons aucunement l’intention de diffuser les théories d’une école. Nous
nous attachons avant tout à décrire les faits tels qu’ils se présentent à l’observation, en faisant
abstraction de toute idée préconçue.”
36“A l’oreille, le finnois fait ‘sonore’, un peu rauque et saccadé, le tout débité rapidement sur
un rythme aux alternances assez rapprochées, modulées selon une phrase musicale aux notes
plutôt aiguës mais descendantes, qui semble suivre une courbe à peu près invariable. Le dis-
cours finnois ne connaît que peu d’écarts mélodiques entre les sommets et les creux de mod-
ulation. La répétition monotone de ces modulations fait tout de suite penser que la langue
ne module pas pour exprimer, mais seulement, pour démarquer les éléments du débit. Les
voyelles ‘marquent’ ; elles éclatent joyeusement sur les lèvres des sujets parlants, tandis que
les consonnes sont assourdies parfois jusqu’au chuintement.”
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To his French colleagues this impressionism would have sounded like a throw-
back to the nineteenth century, maybe even to Rousseau (1782 [written 1755–
1761]). In some respects it is — one way to resist the mainstream is to hark back
to an earlier age and represent its discourse as a lost truth, as Chomsky would do
with his “Cartesian linguistics” (2009 [1966]). Sauvageot is rescuing a musicality
in linguistic analysis that in fact had not been absent in twentieth-century French
linguistics, but was always a minority concern and was marginalized with the
rise of structural linguistics, until its re-emergence with Meschonnic.37
But by the late 1940s, Sauvageot found himself unable actually to get the prom-
ised books on Tamil and Berber out of their signed-up authors, let alone sign up
any further authors.38 In his Klincksieck series there finally appeared only his
own “Sketches” of Finnish and Hungarian (1951). Given the eccentricity of Sau-
vageot’s vision, one can imagine that other authors may have felt themselves
caught between maintaining their standing among more conventional linguists
and producing what he wanted from them, which perhaps could only be man-
aged by someone with his rare “auditory memory”, plus his double saturation
in structuralism and the Finnish and Hungarian philological traditions of Setälä
and Gombocz.
The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (2016) contrasts what he terms the
H-L-C and the H-H-H, where the H-L-C is the Enlightenment outlook inher-
ited by analytic philosphers from Hobbes, Locke and Condillac. The H-H-H is
the Counter-Enlightenment “Romantic” outlook of Hamann, Herder and Hum-
boldt to which Taylor strives to draw philosophers’ attention.These two perspec-
tives are present in modern linguistics, mainly as a result of Saussure’s inclusion
in his lectures of both semiology, an Enlightenment inheritance from the gram-
maire générale tradition, and the self-contained language system impervious to
change by any individual, an inheritance from German linguists, most directly
the Neogrammarians.Their conception of sound laws that followed an exception-
less path “insofar as they are mechanical”, which is to say physical, represented a
neo-Romantic Counter-Enlightenment tradition in which language is something
extra-rational, that follows its own organic path, even though the Neogrammar-
ians and Saussure did not go the full naturalist route of Max Müller and others.
They however also opened up a breach to allow in some Enlightenment through
the role that they allotted to analogy as the only admissible explanation for ap-
37Saussy (2016) revives the history of this alternative tradition, inwhichMeillet figures as, among
other things, supervisor of the doctoral thesis of Milman Parry (1902–1935), whose studies of
contemporary oral recitation in the Balkanswould revolutionize the understanding of Homeric
epic.
38The books announced were Esquisse de la langue tamoule by Pierre Meile (1911–1963) and Es-
quisse de la langue berbère by André Basset (1895–1956).
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parent exceptions to the sound laws. Analogy is a mental rather than a physical
process, and rational in nature.
On the theoretical level, Meillet’s structuralism was universalist. He argued
that small European languages such as Finnish and Hungarian were doomed by
a sort of natural selection that would limit the number of “languages of civiliza-
tion” in Europe (Meillet 1918: 279; see also Sauvageot 2013: 209–210). That was an
Enlightenment position. But unlike Meillet, Sauvageot was H-H-H to the bone.
His personal experiences in Finland and Hungary had proved to him that what
really determined the present and future vitality of a language was its expressive
power. In a book manuscript published posthumously in 1992, he wrote, “If a
language succumbs, it is because it failed in its expressive task” (Si une langue
succombe, c’est qu’elle faillit à sa tâche expressive) (Sauvageot 1992: 160). Sauva-
geot was torn between loyalty to the man to whom he owed everything in career
terms, and the Finnish and Hungarian philologists whose view of their language
was so much more in accord with his own.
Hence his embracing and resisting of a structural linguistics that, in France,
saw Meillet as its head. But outside France, it was developing in various direc-
tions, above all in Prague, where the terms “structural” and “structuralism” were
being explicitly proclaimed by the start of the 1930s. In the English and French
speaking worlds, 1940 is the year when “structural linguistics” starts to appear
regularly (see Joseph 2015). Martinet was the one French linguist in regular con-
tact with the Prague Linguistic Circle, as well as with Copenhagen, where Louis
Hjelmslev (1899–1965) and Viggo Brøndal (1887–1942) were laying the ground for
glossematics. Perhaps it was Meillet’s death in 1936 that licensed French linguists
to be more directly critical of, even hostile to structuralism, particularly as it was
being developed in Prague. Meillet’s successor, Benveniste, was himself ambiva-
lent towards it, as became apparent with the article on the arbitrariness of the
sign that he contributed to the first issue of Hjelmslev’s Acta Linguistica in 1939.
What exactly about structuralism was repellent to Sauvageot? We got some
clues earlier in the Avertissement to the Esquisse de la langue finnoise, when
he wrote about “a negligence in adding to the debate the concrete testimony
that must be brought in by the descriptive study of a given state of language”,
and the neglect of syntax, semantics and vocabulary in favour of inventories of
phonemes and morphemes. More generally, he objected to the “dogmatism” of
the structuralists, as his student and later colleague Jean Perrot would report that
Sauvageot was not indulgent towards his colleagues and his hostility to
dogmatism led him to severe judgements about these dogmatic theoreti-
cians whom he readily called “these gentlemen”, and whom he readily mal-
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treated with irony, for example denouncing a manifest error as “a simple
blunder”. In particular he was rather hard with regard to the “phonolo-
gists”, for instance reproaching Lazicius for behaving as a “disciple of Tru-
betzkoy and the Prague phonologists, whose excesses and dogmatism he
espoused”. (Perrot 2009: 16)39
French linguists from 1925 to 1950 seem on the one hand to want to claim that
they are, along with the Geneva School, the keepers of the Saussurean structural-
ist flame,while on the other hand acting as if structuralism is a foreign perversion.
This aspect of linguistic history has to be read in the context of how nationalist
feeling was developing in the inter-war period, and again with the anti-imperial
wars in Indochina and Algeria in the 1950s, when the Cold War is also central
to the plot; as is the ambivalence of linguists to the massive increase in atten-
tion and status they gained starting with the success of Lévi-Strauss’s Tristes
tropiques in 1955, and the continuing rise of structuralism as the master science
informing thework of Lacan,Merleau-Ponty, Barthes, Greimas and soon the next
generation of French intellectuals who became prominent in the 1960s. Among
the linguists themselves new tensions arose whenMartinet returned in 1955 from
his self-imposed exile, distancing himself from structuralism in favour of a “func-
tionalism” that combined an ultra-structuralist analytical method with genuine
challenges to the how structuralists dealt with dialects, bilingualism and social
differentiation, challenges that were being pushed further by Martinet’s Amer-
ican student Uriel Weinreich (1926–1967) (see, e.g., Weinreich 1954 and Joseph
2016).
But Weinreich also had strong allegiances to Jakobson, who had been the first
to use the word structuralism in print in the 1920s, and had gone on to redefine
it, in conjunction with Trubetzkoy and the Prague School, in ways that directly
contradicted some of Saussure’s core principles. This is what made French lin-
guists resistant to structuralism as redefined by Prague — partly on intellectual
grounds, partly on nationalist ones, in which some degree of jealousy at the suc-
cess of Jakobson and the Prague School in other parts of Europe and America
cannot be ruled out. Sauvageot, and to a lesser degree Benveniste, were more
39“Sauvageot n’était pas indulgent à l’égard de ses confrères et son hostilité au dogmatisme lui
inspirait des jugements sévères sur ces théoriciens dogmatiques qu’il appelait volontiers ‘ces
messieurs’, et qu’il malmenait volontiers ironiquement, dénonçant par exemple comme ‘une
simple bévue’ une erreur manifeste. Il était en particulier assez dur à l’égard des ‘phonolo-
gistes’, reprochant par exemple à Lazicius son comportement de ‘disciple de Troubetzkoï et
des phonologistes de Prague, dont il a épousé les outrances et le dogmatisme’.” Perrot does
not indicate sources for the citations which he indicates. On the Hungarian phonologist Gyula
Lazicius (1896–1957), see Voigt (1986: 288).
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forthright about their resistance to structuralism than others of their contempo-
raries in France, who may have feared being even more marginalized interna-
tionally if they overtly challenged Prague, Jakobson, Trubetzkoy, Hjelmslev et
al.
But it was not just the formalism, the “structural” part of structural linguistics,
that Sauvageot resisted. It was also “linguistics”, insofar as it had pushed philol-
ogy out from the forefront of academic enquiry, to become yesterday’s dusty,
antiquarian pursuit. With it went attention to the fine details of a language, in-
cluding how individual writers discovered and exploited its potential resources.
Philology — the love of language. Linguistics — its cold, clinical study.
It was a loss that Sauvageot, with his heritage from the philologists who taught
him Finnish and Hungarian, sought to rectify — above all in his last major work
(Sauvageot 1973), by which time he no longer needed to be concerned with his
position within the French linguistic establishment. Even so, he had the reputa-
tion of his students to think of; and that may explain why he never published the
book manuscript he entitled La structure du langage (The structure of language)
that appeared in 1992, four years after his death. This book seems determined
to subvert some of the basic principles of Saussurean structuralism, let alone its
later variants, and offer in their place a vision of language grounded in his long
experience of Finnish and Hungarian language and culture, including the ideas
of Setälä and Gombocz and the other great linguists and literary figures whose
individual impact on the languages he had witnessed. Yet Sauvageot can never
escape the shadow of his first linguistics teacher, Meillet, nor does he want to. In
this book he aims at a reconciliation in which we find a rare trace of his appar-
ently avowed Marxism. He distinguishes the “invariants” of a language, which
are its “structure”, from the “variants” which he calls its “superstructure” (Sauva-
geot 1992: 18).
Sauvageot’s encounter with Finno-Ugric philology would limit his embrace
of structuralism — a doctrine whose historical nuances we, starting with me,
have glossed over. We assume that embracing and resisting are either/or options.
History is more complicated than that, which is what makes it interesting. The
resisting embrace can have strategic force: someone who only embraces will not
push the science forward; someonewho only resists will struggle to get a hearing.
The resisting embrace can give one an audience for resistant innovations that
are heard as progress within the status quo, even if, in his heart, the innovator is
committed to overturning it.
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6 Benveniste’s later work: enunciation
Normand (1986) traces the development of “enunciation” in Benveniste’s work
back to papers he published in 1946 and 1949, and notes in particular that his 1954
paper on current trends in linguistics defines a linguist’s three principal tasks as
being to identify what is described using the word language (langue), how to de-
scribe this object (linguistic methodology), and thirdly, to confront “the problem
of signification”. Quoting Benveniste, “Language (langage) has as its function to
say something. What exactly is this something in view of which language is ar-
ticulated and how do we delimit it in relation to language itself? The problem of
signification is posed” (Benveniste 1966 [1954]: 7).40
Signification — essentially, meaning — is implicitly conceived here as lying
outside the language system (langue), while being its raison d’être. Signification
and enunciation occupy a “semantic” realm, distinct from the “semiotic” one of
the language (see the Editors’ Introduction to Benveniste 2012: 49–51). Under-
standing the semantic is the linguist’s third task. The wording makes clear that
signification lies outside language not just as a langue but as the more general
langage as well, being the something that it is the “function” of language and
languages to say. The challenge is to identify and delimit meaning with relation
to language, which is made difficult because language is itself articulated with
this function in view.
Benveniste’s initial presentation of his approach incorporates a questionwhich
it provoked in the minds of other structural linguists, as to whether enunciation,
as use, was not what Saussure meant by parole, speech. He does not directly
answer the question, but indicates how his focus is a different one.
Enunciation is putting the language to work through an individual act of use.
But isn’t this manifestation of enunciation simply parole, the discourse which
is produced each time one speaks? — We must take care to focus on the spe-
cific condition of enunciation: it is the act itself of producing an utterance,
and not the text of the utterance, that is our object. This act is the fact of the
40“Le langage a pour fonction de dire quelque chose.Qu’est exactement ce quelque chose en vue
de quoi le langage est articulé et comment le délimiter par rapport au langage lui-même? Le
problème de la signification est posé.” Ono (2007: 27–57) has shown how in Benveniste’s writ-
ings from 1945 until the definitive formulations in 1974 [1969] and 1974 [1970](a), the meaning
of énonciation is often ambiguous, or even indicates quite clearly what he will eventually refer
to as énoncé. See also Coquet (1987) and Joseph (In Press).
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speaker who mobilizes the language on his or her own behalf. The relation-
ship of the speaker to the language determines the linguistic features of the
enunciation. (Benveniste 1974 [1970][a]: 80)41
The speaker is not “speaker” before the act of enunciation. With enunciation,
speaker becomes both speaker and subject; the enunciation positions him or her
vis-à-vis the language, while at the same time that relationship shapes the enun-
ciation.
In presenting enunciation not as an alternative to structuralist analysis, but as
a parallel track, Benveniste can be said to fulfil a wish expressed by the Neogram-
marians Hermann Osthoff (1847–1909) and Karl Brugmann (1849–1919), when
they remarked that, in the past, “Languages were indeed investigated most ea-
gerly, but people speaking, much too little” (Man erforschte zwar eifrigst die spra-
chen, aber viel zu wenig den sprechenden menschen.) (Osthoff & Brugmann 1878:
iii). But more striking is how far forward looking the approach is, anticipating
ideas of decades later on stance, voice, identity, indexicality, in addition to the
direct continuations of enunciation in the work of Antoine Culioli and others
in France. Pierre Bourdieu’s (1930–2002) conceptions of language and symbolic
power are also grounded in Benveniste, and in fact it was Bourdieu who in 1969
coordinated the assembling and publication of perhaps Benveniste’s most influ-
ential book, the Vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes. It provides the con-
text for understanding what Benveniste means when he says that “the language
contains the society” (see above, p. 144). When he traces the history of a social
institution such as “personal loyalty” back through each of the branches of the
Indo-European language family, adducing precise etymological evidence to show
the very different ways in which loyalty was conceived among Celtic, Germanic,
Baltic, Slavic, Italo-Roman, Greek and Persian tribes and peoples, the conclusion
seems inescapable that the institutional differences among them are historically
bound to the language of their enunciation, so deeply as to be “contained” not
just in the sense of residing within, but in the stronger sense of being prevented
from escaping.
Benveniste’s third task of 1966 [1954] can be read as an attempt at responding
to the problematizing of meaning that was at the heart of behaviourism, the same
41“L’énonciation est cette mise en fonction de la langue par un acte individuel d’utilisation. Le
discours, dira-t-on, qui est produit chaque fois qu’on parle, cettemanifestation de l’énonciation,
n’est-ce pas simplement la ‘parole’? — Il faut prendre garde à la condition spécifique de
l’énonciation : c’est l’acte même de produire un énoncé et non le texte de l’énoncé qui est
notre objet. Cet acte est le fait du locuteur qui mobilise la langue pour son compte. La relation
du locuteur à la langue détermine les caractères linguistiques de l’énonciation.”
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problem that motivated Bloomfield to de-psychologize his linguistics, though
Benveniste attacks the problemwith a different strategy.The insight particular to
Benveniste is that the language system and the speaking person occupy different
conceptual spheres that nevertheless intersect with one another. He explores this
initially, and in greatest detail, in his papers on person and deixis.42 Benveniste’s
semiology as laid out in the second half of his 1974 [1969] paper and the lectures
of late 1968 and early 1969 combines the systematicity of a langue as conceived by
Saussure with the intersystematicity assumed by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–
1914). “There is no trans-systematic sign”, Benveniste (1974 [1969]: 53) writes;43
the value of each sign “is defined solely within the system which integrates it”,
which is perfectly Saussurean. Nevertheless, every signifying system other than
a language must be interpreted through a language. “Every semiology of a non-
linguistic system must make use of a language to translate it; thus it can exist
only through and in the semiology of a language, […] which is the interpretant
of all other systems, linguistic and non-linguistic” (Benveniste 1974 [1969]: 60).44
And from his last lectures: “It is the language as system of expression that is the
interpretant of all institutions and of all culture” (Benveniste 2012: 83).45 One
could argue that this core Benvenistean axiom is implicit in both Saussure and
Peirce, but Peirce in particular might have resisted it. It reflects the way a linguist
thinks, rather than a psychologist.
The turn the lectures then take, which the article did not, is one that Saussure
would certainly have resisted. To say as I have done that Benveniste’s semiology
combines the systematicity of a langue as conceived by Saussure with the inter-
systematicity assumed by Peirce is potentially deceptive, because systematicity
must be understood in a strong sense for Saussure, and in a weaker sense for
Peirce, who places the stress on the “inter-”. Benveniste criticizes Peirce for “mis-
42These include, following on from the 1966 [1946] and 1966 [1949] papers cited above, Ben-
veniste (1966 [1956][a]) and Benveniste (1966 [1958]). It is surprising that, in his review of
Benveniste (1966), Winfred P. Lehmann (1916–2007) categorized these papers as “psycholin-
guistics” (Lehmann 1968). Equally surprising is Lehmann’s view that “If in any of his essays
Benveniste discusses linguistic theory as such, it is in the first three, which treat the develop-
ment of linguistics”. In other words, for Lehmann, what Benveniste is doing is not linguistic
theory at all, which was a compliment from the pen of a non-Chomskyan American linguist
like Lehmann in 1968.
43“Il n’y a pas de signe trans-systématique.”
44“Toute sémiologie d’un système non-linguistique doit emprunter le truchement de la langue,
ne peut donc exister que par et dans la sémiologie de la langue […] ; la langue est l’interprétant
de tous les autres systèmes, linguistiques et non-linguistiques.”
45“C’est la langue comme système d’expression qui est l’interprétant de toutes les institutions et
de toute la culture.”
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taking” words for being the whole of language. It is not words, not lexicon, not se-
mantics or even syntax that is the foundation of structural linguistics, but phonol-
ogy and morphology. And yet, when Saussure is teaching semiology, words are
what he uses to exemplify the sign; he brings in morphology in his discussion of
the associative axis and relative motivation, but sounds hardly figure. Phonemes
do not appear to be signs, just constituents of signifiers, even though the differ-
ences between phonemes are the ultimate source of signification, and that poses
a puzzle: what differentiates a phoneme from a non-speech sound is some sort
of signification that this is a signifying sound.
Here Peirce’s idea of “interpretance” offers a valuable insight: that the very
first meaning of every sign is: “I am a sign. Interpret me”. And even if Benveniste
is right that Peirce only thinks about signification at the level of words, nothing
in principle prevents us from extending this insight to the level of phonemes.
Regarding his critique of Peirce for reducing languages to words, it is worth
noting how widely known Benveniste’s revered teacher Meillet was for his Latin
etymological work, and that Benveniste himself had his broadest impact through
his 1969 Vocabulaire, which is word-based. Its focus is on the semantic, and it can
be seen as his major practical achievement in the linguistics of enunciation. Yet
it shows on every page how understanding the semantic at a deep level requires
detailed examination of the semiotic, and how such semantic understanding is
in turn what allows us to weigh up alternative analyses of phonological and
morphological facts in the semiotic system. Benveniste underscores in his lec-
ture notes “the impossibility of reaching the semantic in language without passing
through the semiotic plus the grammar” (Benveniste 1969: 114).46 Peirce tried to
reach the semantic through words alone, without signs, without the language
system. Saussure did not deny the self-evident link between the semiotic and the
semantic, but observed methodological scruples whereby he, as a grammarian
(the term he usually applied to himself), could only pronounce on the semiotic,
the semantic being the realm of expertise of psychologists and philosophers.
Saussure and Peirce are for Benveniste the key innovative thinkers of two
orders of language and signification. With Peirce, Benveniste folds in the later
phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and of the Husserlian linguist
Hendrik Joseph Pos (1898–1955). Saussure stands at the head of the tradition of
modern linguistics in which Benveniste himself was trained. For Benveniste,
46“l’impossibilité d’atteindre le sémantique en langue sans passer par le sémiotique plus la gram-
maire.”
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Peirce and phenomenology Saussure and structural linguistics
represent the order represent the order
semantic semiotic
intention/intended signifier/signified
enunciation language system
utterance speech
words and things in the world signs and social structure
Structural linguistics is based on the Saussurean order, which excludes consid-
eration of writing. The new linguistics of enunciation envisioned by Benveniste
would combine the two orders, and one of the main aims of his last lectures is to
understand how they are bridged by writing.
Insofar as the marginalization of writing is an aspect of structuralism, Ben-
veniste’s last lectures pass unhesitatingly beyond it. The fundamentally philo-
logical nature of his etymological work makes it pre-structuralist, though in his
explanations of the history of individual words the spirit and basic approach of
structural method come through. And if the central roles he accords to writing
and enunciation make him a post-structuralist, that is certainly not a flag he
wanted to wave. Benveniste strove to reconcile his vision of the future path of
linguistics with its present and past. Or, more precisely, its pasts.
7 Conclusion
This study has focused on a small set of linguists whom histories of linguistics
place in the structuralist period, and who embraced formalist principles to a
greater or lesser extent while also resisting them. It has examined some of the
motives for their resistance, which include a perceived abandonment of attention
to phonological and philological detail (Benveniste and Sauvageot), as well as to
speakers (the same two, plus Martinet), along with a proclivity towards atomism
and discontinuity (Meschonnic). Interpersonal relations, political affiliations and
national identity have also come into the picture.
There are other chapters to be added to this story, including the polemic be-
tween Bloomfield and Leo Spitzer (1887–1960), with Spitzer (1944) calling out
Bloomfield’s mechanism for the reductionism it entailed; C. K. Ogden and the as-
sociated figures studied by McElvenny (2018); Hjelmslev, who never renounced
his early Saussurean commitments but moved progressively away from what he
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saw as the prioritizing of form over function and meaning (Joseph 2018a); and
of course Chomsky, who did battle with the methodological and epistemologi-
cal commitments of the older generation of linguists who are generally classed
as “American structuralists”, but where Chomsky attacked from a more deeply
structuralist position.
My aim may seem counter-structuralist in trying to undo the paradigm. Yet,
deep down, what is this enterprise if not a search for the Order which governs
the movement of the stars of the modern science of language, and which is the
foundation of our society as its practitioners? Without this principle, everything
would revert to chaos.
References
Benveniste, Émile. 1935.Origines de la formation des noms en indo-européen. Paris:
Adrien-Maisonneuve.
Benveniste, Émile. 1966 [1946]. Structures des relations de personne dans le verbe.
In Problèmes de linguistique générale, vol. 1, 224–236. Paris: Gallimard. Original
in Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris 43.1.
Benveniste, Émile. 1966 [1949]. Le système sublogique des prépositions en latin.
In Problèmes de linguistique générale, vol. 1, 132–139. Paris: Gallimard. Original
in Travaux de Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 5: Recherches structurales.
Benveniste, Émile. 1966 [1954]. Tendances récentes en linguistique générale. In
Problèmes de linguistique générale, vol. 1, 3–17. Paris: Gallimard. Original in
Journal de Psychologie Normale et Pathologique 47–51.1–2: 130–145.
Benveniste, Émile. 1966 [1956](a). La nature des pronoms. In Problèmes de linguis-
tique générale, vol. 1, 251–257. Paris: Gallimard. Original in For Roman Jakobson.
Morris Halle, Horace G. Lunt and Hugh McLean (eds.), 34–37.
Benveniste, Émile. 1966 [1956](b). Remarques sur la fonction du langage dans la
découverte freudienne. In Problèmes de linguistique générale, vol. 1, 75–87. Paris:
Gallimard. Original in La Psychanalyse 1.3–16.
Benveniste, Émile. 1966 [1958]. De la subjectivité dans le langage. In Problèmes de
linguistique générale, vol. 1, 258–266. Paris: Gallimard. Original in Journal de
Psychologie Normale et Pathologique 55, 257–265.
Benveniste, Émile. 1966. Problèmes de linguistique générale. Vol. 1. Paris: Galli-
mard.
Benveniste, Émile. 1974 [1968](a). Ce langage qui fait l’histoire (interview with
Guy Dumur). In Problèmes de linguistique générale, vol. 2, 29–40. Paris: Galli-
mard. Original in Le nouvel observateur, spécial littéraire 210 bis, 28–34.
170
6 The resistant embrace of formalism in the work of Benveniste and Sauvageot
Benveniste, Émile. 1974 [1968](b). Structuralisme et linguistique (interview with
Pierre Daix). In Problèmes de linguistique générale, vol. 2, 11–28. Paris: Galli-
mard. Original in Les lettres modernes 1242, 10–13.
Benveniste, Émile. 1974 [1969]. Sémiologie de la langue. In Problèmes de linguis-
tique générale, vol. 2, 43–66. Paris: Gallimard. Original in Semiotica 1.1–12,
2.127–135.
Benveniste, Émile. 1969. Vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes. Paris: Mi-
nuit. 2 vols.
Benveniste, Émile. 1974 [1970](a). L’appareil formel de l’énonciation. In Problèmes
de linguistique générale, vol. 2, 79–88. Paris: Gallimard. Original in Langages
17, 12–18.
Benveniste, Émile. 1974 [1970](b). Structure de la langue et structure de la société.
In Problèmes de linguistique générale, vol. 2, 91–102. Paris: Gallimard. Original
in Linguaggi nella società e nella tecnica (Congresso Internazionale Olivetti, Mi-
lano, 14–17 ottobre 1968), 459–460. Milan: Edizioni di Comunità.
Benveniste, Émile. 2016 [1973]. Dictionary of Indo-European concepts and society.
Trans. by Elizabeth Palmer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. First pub-
lished as Indo-European language and society, Coral Gables, Florida: University
of Miami Press, 1973. Translation of Benveniste (1969).
Benveniste, Émile. 1974. Problèmes de linguistique générale. Vol. 2. Paris: Galli-
mard.
Benveniste, Émile. 2012. Dernières leçons: Collège de France, 1968 et 1969. Paris:
École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Éditions Gallimard & Éditions
du Seuil. English version, Last Lectures: Collège de France, 1968 and 1969, John
E. Joseph, trans. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, in press.
Bloomfield, Leonard. 1945. Secondary and tertiary responses to language. Lan-
guage 20(2). 45–55.
Cassirer, Ernst. 1945. Structuralism in modern linguistics. Word 2(1). 99–120.
DOI:10.1080/00437956.1945.11659249
Chevalier, Jean-Claude with Pierre Encrevé. 2006. Combats pour la linguistique,
de Martinet à Kristeva: Essai de dramaturgie épistémologique. Lyons: ENS édi-
tions.
Chomsky, Noam. 2009 [1966]. Cartesian linguistics: A chapter in the history of
rationalist thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Edited by James
McGilvray.
Coquet, Jean-Claude. 1987. Linguistique et sémiologie. Actes sémiotiques–
Documents IX 88. 5–20.
171
John E. Joseph
Dosse, François. 1997 [1991]. History of structuralism, vol. 1, The rising sign: 1945–
1966. Trans. by Deborah Glassman. Minneapolis & London: University of Min-
nesota Press. Original publishedHistoire du structuralisme, I: Le champ du signe,
1945–1966, Paris: La Découverte, 1991.
Dunkel, George. 1981. Typology versus reconstruction. In Yoel L. Arbeitman &
Allan R. Bomhard (eds.), Bono homini donum: Essays in historical linguistics in
memory of J. Alexander Kerns, 559–570. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Firth, John R. 1933. Rev. of Vossler (1932). Philosophy 8(30). 234–236.
Gombrich, Ernst H. 1960. Art and illusion: A study in the psychology of pictorial
representation. London: Phaidon.
Joseph, John E. 1999. How structuralist was “American structuralism”? Bulletin
of the Henry Sweet Society for the History of Linguistic Ideas (33). 23–28.
Joseph, John E. 2001. The exportation of structuralist ideas from linguistics to
other fields: An overview. In Sylvain Auroux, E. F. K. Koerner, Hans-Josef
Niederehe & Kees Versteegh (eds.), History of the language sciences: An inter-
national handbook on the evolution of the study of language from the beginnings
to the present, vol. 2, 1880–1908. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Joseph, John E. 2002. FromWhitney to Chomsky: Essays in the history of American
linguistics. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Joseph, John E. 2015. Structural linguistics. In Keith Allan (ed.), Routledge hand-
book of linguistics, 431–446. London: Routledge.
Joseph, John E. 2016. Divided allegiance: Martinet’s preface to Weinreich’s Lan-
guages in contact (1953). Historiographia Linguistica 43(3). 343–362.
Joseph, John E. 2018a. From Saussure to Rask: The curious trajectory of Louis
Hjelmslev. In M. W. Bruno, F. Cimatti, D. Chiricò, A. De Marco, E. Fadda, G. Lo
Feudo, M. Mazzeo & C. Stancati (eds.), Linguistica e filosofia del linguaggio:
Studi in onore di Daniele Gambarara, 295–305. Milan: Mimesis.
Joseph, John E. 2018b. Language-body continuity in the linguistics-semiology-
poetics-traductology of Henri Meschonnic. Comparative Critical Studies 18(3).
311–329.
Joseph, John E. In Press. ‘‘Énonciation” en anglais: Émile Benveniste et la
(re)traduction d’une utterance ambigüe. In Giuseppe d’Ottavi & Valentina
Chepiga (eds.), Traduire la linguistique, traduire les linguistes. Louvain-la-
Neuve: Academia.
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Lehmann, Winfred P. 1968. Rev. of Benveniste (1966). Language 44(1). 91–96.
172
6 The resistant embrace of formalism in the work of Benveniste and Sauvageot
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. 1945. L’analyse structurale en linguistique et en anthropolo-
gie. Word 1. 33–53. Repr. as opening chapter of Lévi-Strauss, Anthropologie
structurale, vol. 1, Paris: Plon, 1958. English version, Structural anthropology,
Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf, trans. New York: Basic Books,
1963.
McElvenny, James. 2018. Language and meaning in the age of modernism: C. K.
Ogden and his contemporaries. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Meillet, Antoine. 1903. Introduction à l’étude comparative des langues indo-
européennes. Paris: Hachette.
Meillet, Antoine. 1918. Les langues dans l’Europe nouvelle. Paris: Payot.
Meillet, Antoine. 1931. Esquisse d’une histoire de la langue latine, II ed. Paris: Ha-
chette.
Meillet, Antoine. 1905–1906. Comment les mots changent de sens. Année soci-
ologique 9. 1–38.
Meschonnic, Henri. 1982. Critique du rhythme: Anthropologie historique du lan-
gage. Paris: Verdier.
Meschonnic, Henri. 2009. Traduire, et la Bible, dans la théorie du langage et de la
société. Nouvelle revue d’esthétique 3. 19–26. English version, Translating, and
the Bible, in the theory of language and of society, John E. Joseph, trans., in
Marko Pajević, ed., The Henri Meschonnic Reader. Edinburgh: Edinburgh Uni-
versity Press, in press.
Normand, Claudine. 1986. Les termes de l’énonciation de Benveniste. Histoire-
Epistémologie-Langage 8(2). 191–206.
Ono, Aya. 2007. La notion d’énonciation chez Émile Benveniste. Limoges: Lambert-
Lucas.
Osthoff, Hermann&Karl Brugmann. 1878. Vorwort.Morphologische Untersuchun-
gen auf dem Gebiete der indogermanischen Sprachen 1. iii–xx.
Perrot, Jean. 2007. Aurélien Sauvageot: L’homme et l’œuvre. Revue d’études
françaises 12. 295–307.
Perrot, Jean. 2009. La carrière et l’œuvre d’Aurélien Sauvageot: Engagement et
retenue dans les options linguistiques. Études finno-ougriennes 41. 9–25.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1782 [written 1755–1761]. Essai sur l’origine des langues,
où il est parlé de la mélodie et de l’imitation musicale. In Collection complète
des œuvres de J. J. Rousseau, citoyen de Genève, vol. 8, 355–434. Geneva.
Saussure, Ferdinand de. 1879.Mémoire sur le système primitif des voyelles dans les
langues indo-européennes. Leipzig: Teubner.
Saussure, Ferdinand de. 1922 [1916]. Cours de linguistique générale. Paris: Payot.
Edited by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye.
173
John E. Joseph
Saussy, Haun. 2016.The ethnography of rhythm: Orality and its technologies. New
York: Fordham University Press.
Sauvageot, Aurélien. 1946. Esquisse de la langue finnoise. Paris: La Nouvelle Édi-
tion. Reissued Paris: Klincksieck, 1949.
Sauvageot, Aurélien. 1951. Esquisse de la langue hongroise. Paris: Klincksieck.
Sauvageot, Aurélien. 1973. L’élaboration de la langue finnoise. Paris: Klincksieck.
Sauvageot, Aurélien. 1992. La structure du langage. Aix-en-Provence: Publications
de l’Université de Provence.
Sauvageot, Aurélien. 2013. Souvenirs de ma vie hongroise. New Ed. Budapest: Col-
lège Eötvös József ELTE — Institut Français de Budapest. Orig. publ. Budapest:
Corvina, 1988.
Skinner, Quentin. 1969. Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas. His-
tory and Theory 8(1). 3–53.
Spitzer, Leo. 1944. Answer to Mr. Bloomfield (Language 20.45). Language 20(4).
245–251. Referring to Bloomfield (1945).
Taylor, Charles. 2016.The language animal: The full shape of the human linguistic
capacity. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press.
Voigt, Vilmos. 1986. Semiotics in Hungary. In Thomas A. Sebeok & Jean Umiker-
Sebeok (eds.),The semiotic sphere, 279–292. New York: Plenum.
Vossler, Karl. 1932. The spirit of language in civilization. Trans. by Oscar Oeser.
London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Original: Geist und Kultur in der
Sprache, Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925.
Weinreich, Uriel. 1954. Is a structural dialectology possible?Word 10. 388–400.
174
